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INTRODUCTION
Over 20 years ago, in Agins v. City of Tiburon,I a case involving a
facial challenge to a residential zoning ordinance, the United States
Supreme Court explained the criteria for finding such measures un-
constitutional under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment: 2
The application of a general zoning law to particular
property affects a taking if the ordinance does not sub-
stantially advance legitimate state interests ... or denies
an owner economically viable use of his land.3
Since 1980, the Court has frequently reiterated and applied the
"substantial advancement" prong of Agins as a test for regulatory
takings, in cases involving a wide variety of both facial and as-
applied challenges to legislative enactments and regulatory actions.4
Analysts have routinely recognized that,
1. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
2. The Takings Clause provides, "private property shall [not] be
taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
AMEND. V.
3. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
4. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 202 (2001); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes
at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 704 (1999), Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374, 385 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519,
534 (1992); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
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[i]n the years since the Supreme Court's 1980 decision in
Agins, the two-pronged takings test has been repeatedly
cited by the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts
as part of its accepted regulatory takings jurisprudence.
5
Likewise, the substantial advancement standard is recognized as a
mainstream regulatory takings test by virtually all authoritative legal
treatises and practice guides.
6
U.S. 470, 485 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825, 834 (1987); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985).
5. Ronald H. Rosenberg & Nancy Stroud, When Lochner Met
Dolan: The Attempted Transformation of American Land-Use Law
by Constitutional Interpretation, 33 URB. LAW. 663, 671 (2001).
The substantial advancement standard is equally well established as
a regulatory takings test in the lower courts. See, e.g., Anne T.
Kadlecek, The Effect of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on
the Law of Regulatory Takings, 68 WASH. L. REV. 415, 420 (1993)
("Since 1980, most lower courts have applied the Agins two-part test
in their own takings analyses."); James S. Burling, Endangered Spe-
cies, Wetlands, and Other Critters-Is It Against Nature to Pay for a
Taking?, 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 309, 335 (1992) ("The most
commonly articulated and accepted test for determining whether or
not a governmental action has reached the threshold for a regulatory
taking is Justice Powell's two-prong test in Agins.").
6. See, e.g., 1 RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING
§ 6:63.60 (4th ed. 2003) ("The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated
that a regulation of land use constitutes a taking 'if the ordinance
does not substantially advance legitimate state interests'... This
'substantially advance' taking test... has been construed by the Su-
preme Court as a general standard for judicial review of taking
claims."); 11 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 32.28 (3rd ed.) ("A 'taking'
is deemed to have occurred where the application of a zoning ordi-
nance to a particular property does not substantially advance legiti-
mate state interests, or where the ordinance denies an owner eco-
nomically viable use of his or her land."); 8A MICH. CIV. JUR.
EMINENT DOMAIN § 14: Factors for Determining Taking ("Land use
regulations effect a taking in two general situations: when they do
not substantially advance a legitimate state interest, or when they
deny an owner economically viable use of his land."); 2 GA. JUR.
PROP. § 19:53, Purposes for Which Eminent Domain May Be Exer-
2004]
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Notwithstanding this impressive array of Supreme Court authority
and legal commentary, a few observers have persistently maintained
that the Agins substantial advancement prong should be redenomi-
nated as a substantive due process inquiry, not a Fifth Amendment
takings test.7 One of the most prominent of these writers, John D.
Echeverria, has gone so far as to publish an article with the provoca-
tive title, Does a Regulation That Fails to Advance a Legitimate
Governmental Interest Result in a Regulatory Taking?8 I say pro-
vocative because the answer to Echeverria's titular question seems
straightforward-of course it does. After all, the Supreme Court has
proclaimed this fact in eight majority opinions over nearly a quarter
of a century,9 and has applied the substantial advancement standard
to find or uphold the finding of a regulatory taking on three of those
occasions. Thus, the substantial advancement inquiry is a well-
established test for a regulatory taking, as a matter of black-letter
law. But presumably, Echeverria's intention was not to have his
query taken literally, but rather to get at the more interesting under-
lying questions of why the substantial advancement standard is a
cised, Generally (updated Aug. 2003); Zoning: Proof of Inverse
Condemnation from Excessive Land Use Regulation, 31 AM. JUR.
PROOF OF FACTS 563 (3rd ed. updated Aug. 2003) ("Successful regu-
latory takings challenges (also referred to as inverse condemnation)
to zoning and land use regulations will essentially depend on proof
of facts showing that the regulations (1) fail to substantially advance
legitimate governmental interests..."); 138 N.J. PRAC., REAL ESTATE
LAW & PRACTICE § 42.17 (2d ed. 2002).
7. See, e.g., Edward J. Sullivan, Emperors and Clothes: The Ge-
nealogy and Operation of the Agins Tests, 33 URB. L. 343 (2001);
John D. Echeverria, Takings and Errors, 51 ALA. L. REv. 1047
(2000); John D. Echeverria & Sharon Dennis, The Takings Issue and
the Due Process Clause: A Way Out of a Doctrinal Confusion, 17
VT. L. REV. 695-721 (1993); Glen E. Summers, Private Property
Without Lochner: Toward a Takings Jurisprudence Uncorrupted by
Substantive Due Process, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 837-85 (1993).
8. 29 ENVTL. L. 853 (1999).
9. See supra, note 4.
10. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526
U.S. 687, 703-07 (1999); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
384-96 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,
831-40 (1987).
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takings test, and what its significance may be in the overall context
of the high court's takings jurisprudence. This article seeks to ad-
dress those questions.
Part I of this article" examines the origin and scope of the Agins
substantial advancement test. The Agins Court's citation to its pre-
vious use of the standard in a due process case, Nectow v. City of
Cambridge,12 is shown to have little independent significance in
view of the historically close relationship between the Due Process
and Takings Clauses, and the substantive similarity of the Agins tak-
ings tests to those set out just two terms earlier in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 13 The substantial advance-
ment test has proven to be a robust standard that has been invoked
over a wide range of land-use disputes, and the Court has pointedly
spumed all entreaties to reconsider its use as a takings criterion.
In Part 11,14 this article will take up the Supreme Court's recent de-
cisions in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 15 City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey,16 and Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.' 7 Contrary to assertions that
Eastern Enterprises signaled the relegation of the first Agins prong
to a substantive due process standard, it will be shown that these
three decisions taken together demonstrate the Court's uniform, con-
tinuing commitment to the substantial advancement test as a gener-
ally applicable regulatory takings guide.
Part 11118 considers the standard of review for regulatory takings
cases brought under Agins' first prong, and why it matters. After a
half century of deference toward regulations affecting the rights of
property owners, the Supreme Court has plainly enunciated a re-
quirement of mid-level scrutiny in reviewing takings claims under
the substantial advancement test. This development did not occur by
chance, nor was it the result of "conservative judicial activism"" in
11. See infra, text accompanying notes 22-80.
12. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
13. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 81-129.
15. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
16. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
17. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 130-77.
19. See, e.g., Douglas T. Kendall, Timothy J. Dowling, Sharon
Buccino, & Elaine Weiss, Conservative Judicial Activism and the
20041
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any meaningful sense. Rather, it constitutes an important recogni-
tion that the modem regulatory enterprise has become a unique
threat to the individual values the Constitution was designed to pro-
tect.
Finally, Part IV 20 places arguments against the substantial ad-
vancement test and heightened scrutiny in the larger context of gen-
eralized opposition to the doctrine of regulatory takings. Such ar-
guments have regularly been placed before the Supreme Court in the
81 years since its seminal regulatory takings decision in Pennsyl-
vania Coal v. Mahon,21 but the Court shows no inclination to aban-
don this important and consistent-if sometimes messy--doctrine.
I. THE SUPREME COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY APPLIED THE
SUBSTANTIAL ADVANCEMENT TEST To REGULATORY TAKINGS
CLAIMS FOR NEARLY T QUARTER OF A CENTURY
A. The Doctrinal Origins of the Substantial Advancement Test
1. The Nectow Connection
The most straightforward argument for relegating Agins' substan-
tial advancement standard to a due process inquiry rests on the tex-
tual observation that, in setting forth the first prong of its takings
test, the Agins Court cited to Nectow v. City of Cambridge, a chal-
lenge to a zoning ordinance brought under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause. The implicit reasoning of these critics
seems to be that, because the language of "substantial advancement"
was previously used in a due process case, when that case is subse-
quently cited in a regulatory takings decision, the cited language
23must remain a due process standard. It has even been suggested
Environment: An Assessment of the Threat, 32 ENVTL. L. REP.
10835 (July 2002) (attributing virtually every modem decision up-
holding the constitutional rights of property owners to "anti-
environmental" or "conservative" judicial activism).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 179-97.
21. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
22. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (citing
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)).
23. See, e.g., Thomas E. Roberts, Regulatory Takings in the Wake
of Tahoe-Sierra and the IOLTA Decision, 35 URB. LAw. 759, 778
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that the test was inserted into Agins by mistake-apparently on the
premise that the Supreme Court can't be relied on to distinguish one
Constitutional provision from another.
24
The difficulties with this argument are manifold. Perhaps most
crucially, it assumes a doctrinal fastidiousness the Court has never
shown. Standards and criteria developed in cases brought under one
Constitutional provision are commonly brought to bear on issues
implicating completely different clauses or even Amendments, with-
(2003) ("In Agins v. City of Tiburon, the Court drew the substantially
advance test directly from the Due Process Clause."); Thomas E.
Roberts, Facial Takings Claims under Agins-Nectow: A Procedural
Loose End, 24 U. HAw. L. REv. 623, 640 (2002) ("[T]he Agins
newly minted 'substantially advance legitimate state interests' test
for takings came directly from Nectow, yet the Court's opinion does
not note that Nectow was a substantive due process case."); Echever-
ria, supra note 8, at 865 ("[I]t is obvious from the Court's reliance in
Penn Central and Agins on Nectow, Goldblatt, and Village of Euclid
that the purported means-end takings test was derived from, and
simply restates, a due process test."); Jerold S. Kayden, Land-use
Regulations, Rationality, and Judicial Review: The RSVP in the Nol-
lan Invitation (Part 1), 23 URB. LAW. 301, 314-15 (1991) ("Agins
cited Nectow - a due process, not a just compensation, case-as the
exclusive source of its first prong, thereby mixing due process apples
with just compensation oranges.").
24. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 23, at 639-40 ("The entry of the
'substantially advance legitimate state interests' language into the
takings lexicon can most charitably be described as a mistake, as it
was drawn from Nectow v. City of Cambridge, a substantive due
process case.... Since there is no acknowledgment by the Agins
Court of the due process parentage of its substantially advance test,
one can only speculate as to whether the decision to transfer the
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process test to the Fifth
Amendment takings clause was done consciously or by mistake.")
(footnotes omitted); Douglas T. Kendall, Timothy J. Dowling & An-
drew W. Schwartz, TAKINGS LITIGATION HANDBOOK 237 (2000)
("Agins provides no evidence that the Court desired to create an en-
tirely new standard of takings liability."); Echeverria, supra note 8,
at 858 (attributing Supreme Court's adoption of substantial ad-
vancement takings test to "an inadvertent muddling of legal doc-
trines.").
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out protests from analysts that these tests must remain permanently
wed to the applications in which the Court first found them useful.
We may learn, for example, that the Court recently decided a case by
examining whether the government action was necessary to advance
a compelling state interest, and was narrowly tailored to achieve that
goal. Under which Constitutional provision must this case have
been brought? There is no way to tell. The given test might be ap-
plied in the context of a First Amendment claim (involving either the
Free Speech25 or Free Exercise Clause2 6), an Equal Protection case
involving a suspect classification,27 or a substantive due process
claim implicating a fundamental liberty interest.28  The use of
evaluative standards that seem similar or even identical does not im-
ply that the Court has confused the Free Exercise Clause with the
Equal Protection Clause, or that it has chosen to use the same test for
both clauses by mistake.2
9
The migration of standards between the Takings and Due Process
Clauses is especially unremarkable, given the close historical rela-
tionship between the two provisions. Indeed, we should not over-
look the fact that Agins was a due process case, in the sense that the
issue before the Court was "whether municipal zoning ordinances
took appellants' property without just compensation in violation of
25. See, e.g., United States v. Amer. Library Ass'n, 123 S.Ct.
2297, 2303 (2003).
26. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
27. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2335 (2003).
28. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993).
29. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834
n.3 (1987):
There is no reason to believe (and the language of our
cases gives some reason to disbelieve) that so long as the
regulation of property is at issue, the standards for tak-
ings challenges, due process challenges, and equal pro-
tection challenges are identical, any more than there is
any reason to believe that so long as the regulation of
speech is at issue, the standards for due process chal-
lenges, equal protection challenges, and First Amendment
challenges are identical.
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the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments., 30 On its own terms, the
Takings Clause-like the rest of the Bill of Rights-applies only
against the federal government. 31 It was not until the Fifth Amend-
ment was deemed "incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause in 189732 that it became possible to plead a
cause of action against a state or local governmental entity under the
Takings Clause. In the first decades following this development, the
fact that nearly every takings claim also entailed a due process viola-
tion led to a substantial conflation of terminology. 33 Indeed, Justice
Stevens stated in 1977 that the Court in the early years of the 20th
century had "fused the two express constitutional restrictions on any
state interference with private property, that property shall not be
taken without due process nor for a34public purpose without just
compensation, into a single standard," and that "this principle was
applied in Nectow."
35
Thus, far from being surprised that Nectow was cited in Agins, we
should be surprised if it were not cited in other regulatory takings
cases-and, in fact, it has been. Even the recently proclaimed "pole-
30. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 257 (emphasis added).
31. See, e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co., 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 176-77 (1872) ("[T]hough the Constitution of
the United States provides that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation, it is well settled that this is a
limitation on the power of the Federal government, and not on the
States.").
32. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239
(1897).
33. This tendency was evident from the very outset. In Chicago,
B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, the first case to apply the federal Takings
Clause against a state entity via the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court stated, "The legislature may prescribe a form of procedure to
be observed in the taking of private property for public use, but it is
not due process of law if provision be not made for compensation."
Id. at 236.
34. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 514 (1977)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
35. Id.
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star" 36 of the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence, Penn Central,
cites Nectow as authority. 37 Of course, the same objections can be
raised to Nectow's appearance in Penn Central as to its role in
Agins,38 but the argument threatens to slide down a slippery slope. It
is one thing to cling to a formalistic insistence that each Constitu-
tional provision has its own neatly compartmentalized set of doc-
trines, but it is something else again to insist that violating these
largely imaginary doctrinal boundaries should be grounds for jetti-
soning the Supreme Court's entire corpus of regulatory takings
law.
39
The talismanic rejection of the substantial advancement standard
because of its connection to Nectow seems even more dubious since
even the most adamant Takings Clause doves40 have traditionally
grounded much of their own interpretation of takings law on due
process cases. For example, proponents of the view that the substan-
tial advancement test should be restricted to substantive due process
claims because of its use in Nectow have approvingly noted the Su-
36. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 202, 326 n.23 (2001) (quoting Palazzolo v. State of Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
37. See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
127 (1978) (citing Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188
(1928)).
38. See Echeverria, supra note 8, at 857-58 ("In Penn Central, the
Court relied upon due process, not takings, precedents ...Nectow
patently was not a takings case, but instead involved a due process
claim that the ordinance 'deprived [the owner] of his property with-
out due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.") (footnotes omitted).
39. See, e.g., J. Peter Byme, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of
the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOL. L. Q. 89 (1995).
40. I prefer the designation "Takings Clause doves" to the more
familiar "police power hawks" (see, e.g., Gideon Kanner, Rolling the
Dice With Ambrose Bierce, 54 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 6: 12,
12 (2002); A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodi-
versity: What Is Its Niche?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 555, 593 n.194
(1993)), since those commentators who oppose an expansive appli-
cation of the Takings Clause do not necessarily base their arguments
on the government's supposedly unbridled regulatory authority un-
der the police power.
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preme Court's reliance on Hadacheck v. Sebastian,4 1 a 1915 case
brought under the Due Process 42 and Equal Protection Clauses, 43 for
the proposition that the government can inflict even extreme eco-
nomic injury upon property owners without incurring takings liabil-
ity.44 Other partisans of the regulatory state have reliably rested their
takings analyses on Mugler v. Kansas,45 a pre-incorporation due
process case, 46 and many Takings Clause doves seem eager to en-
dorse the "state exhaustion" ripeness doctrine of Williamson County
Regional Planning Agency v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,47 de-
spite its express derivation by analogy to a due process case, Parratt
41. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
42. See id. at 407.
43. See id. at 412.
44. See John D. Echeverria, The Turning of the Tide: The Tahoe-
Sierra Regulatory Takings Decision, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11235,
11249 (2002); See, John A. Humbach, Constitutional Limits On the
Power to Take Private Property: Public Purpose and Public Use, 66
OR. L. REV. 547, 581 n.222 (1987).
45. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
46. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 39, at 94-96; John A. Humbach,
Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 9-19 (1993); Douglas T. Kendall, The Limits
to Growth and the Limits to the Takings Clause, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
547, 565 n.95 (1992); John A. Humbach, Economic Due Process
and the Takings Clause, 4 PACE ENvTL. L. REV. 311, 316-17 (1987).
But see R. S. Radford, Why Rent Control Is a Regulatory Taking, 6
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 755, 756 (1995) ("[N]ineteenth century cases
such as Mugler v. Kansas, frequently cited by advocates of regula-
tion as bearing on regulatory takings law, were in fact litigated ex-
clusively as violations of the Due Process Clause.").
47. 473 U.S. 172, 194-98 (1985). See, e.g., John D. Echeverria,
Regulatory Takings After Brown, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10626, 10630
(2003) (lauding the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Legal
Foundation of Washington as "bolstering" Williamson County's state
exhaustion rule); Kendall, Dowling & Schwartz, supra note 24, at
59-62 (urging government attorneys to use Williamson County to
force takings claimants into state court, "even if the claimant's the-
ory of relief is untested or recovery is unlikely in state court.").
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v. Taylor.48 The offensiveness of importing such due process stan-
dards into takings law seems sometimes to depend largely on
whether these standards would make recovery of compensation more
or less likely-that is, on just whose ox is being gored.
2. Penn Central's Paternity
In any event, it is not necessary to go back to Nectow to trace the
parentage of Agins' two-pronged takings test, since its immediate
progenitor is much closer at hand. Some writers have expressed sur-
prise that the Supreme Court would set out a wholly new takings
standard in Agins, just two terms after having enunciated another
dual-pronged takings test in Penn Central.49 Agins' inquiry into
whether a regulation substantially advances legitimate state interests
or deprives the owner of economically viable use of land has been
described as "quite different," 50 "distinct," 5 ' and even "an about
face" 52 from Penn Central's focus on "the character of the govern-
mental action" 53 and "the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant., 54 Other commentators, however, have recognized that the
Agins and Penn Central standards are in fact conceptually equiva-
lent; only the terminology differs.
55
48. 451 U.S. 527 (1981), cited in Williamson County, 473 U.S. at
195.
49. See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
127 (1978) ("[A] use restriction on real property may constitute a
'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substan-
tial public purpose or perhaps if it has an unduly harsh impact upon
the owner's use of the property.").
50. Byrne, supra note 39, at 104.
51. Robert Meltz, Dwight H. Merriam, & Richard M. Frank, THE
TAKINGS ISSUE 136 (1999).
52. Daniel R. Mandelker & John M. Payne, PLANNING AND
CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 118 (5th
ed. 2001).
53. 438 U.S. at 124.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Dana Larkin, Dramatic Decreases in Clarity: Using
the Penn Central Analysis to Solve the Tahoe-Sierra Controversy, 40
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1597, 1620 (2003) ("In Penn Central, the Court
rested its decision on the fact that protecting historical landmarks
[VOL. XV
LAND USE REGULATION
The Supreme Court itself has often noted the doctrinal equivalence
of Agins and Penn Central. In 1985, writing for a unanimous Court
in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,56 Justice White
made a smooth transition from Penn Central to Agins:
We have frequently suggested that governmental land-use
regulation may under extreme circumstances amount to a
"taking" of the affected property. See, e.g., Williamson
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). We have
was a legitimate state interest. Also, in formulating the viability
prong of its test, the Agins Court cited to Penn Central's economic
impact analysis. Apparently, the Court saw this prong as 'closely
related' to the investment-backed expectations issue and sought to
combine these two points into its 'economically viable use' prong.")
(citations deleted); Jordan C. Kahn, Lake Tahoe Clarity and Takings
Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court Advances Land Use Planning in
Tahoe-Sierra, 26 ENVIRONS 33, 57 n.160 (Fall 2002) ("the 'character
of government action' factor in the Penn Central analysis . . .in-
cludes a consideration of whether the regulation at issue does or
'does not substantially advance legitimate state interests'."); Victoria
Sutton, Constitutional Taking Doctrine - Did Lucas Really Make a
Difference?, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 505, 509 (2001) (characteriz-
ing Penn Central's "character of the government action" test as "the
progenitor of the 'substantially advances legitimate state interests'
test articulated two years later in Agins."); Roderick E. Walston, The
Constitution and Property: Due Process, Regulatory Takings, and
Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 379, 400 ("[T]he Penn Central
and Agins balancing tests are similar in many respects, and have of-
ten been cited interchangeably by the Supreme Court."); George
Skouras, TAKINGS LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT: JUDICIAL
OVERSIGHT OF THE REGULATORY STATE'S ACQUISITION, USE AND
CONTROL OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 55 (2000) (Agins "attempted to
improve upon the tests used in Penn Central"); R. S. Radford, Why
Rent Control Is a Regulatory Taking, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 755,
757 (1995) ("In Agins, the two-part Penn Central inquiry was recast
in terms of whether the challenged measure: (1) substantially ad-
vances legitimate state interests; or (2) denies the owner economi-
cally viable use of the land.").
56. 106 S.Ct. 455.
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never precisely defined those circumstances, see id., at
123-128; but our general approach was summed up in
Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), where we
stated that the application of land-use regulations to a
particular piece of property is a taking only "if the ordi-
nance does not substantially advance legitimate state in-
terests ... or denies an owner economically viable use of
his land.",
57
Two years later, Justice O'Connor implicitly affirmed this equiva-
lence in her majority opinion in Hodel v. Irving,58 "[t]he framework
for examining the question whether a regulation of property amounts
to a taking requiring just compensation is firmly established and has
been regularly and recently reaffirmed., 59 Justice Stevens expressed
the same view, writing for the Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal
Assoc. v. DeBenedictis:
60
The two factors that the Court considered relevant have
become integral parts of our takings analysis. We have
held that land use regulation can effect a taking if it "does
not substantially advance legitimate state interests ... or
denies an owner economically viable use of his land."
Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); see also
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978).61
57. Id. at 459.
58. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
59. Id. at 713-14.
60. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
61. Id. at 485. Indeed, Justice Stevens implicitly traced the
Court's two-pronged takings inquiry back to the font of its modem
takings jurisprudence, Pennsylvania Coal 260 U.S. 393 (1922):
Justice Holmes rested on two propositions, both critical
to the Court's decision. First, because it served only pri-
vate interests, not health or safety, the Kohler Act could
not be "sustained as an exercise of the police power."
Second, the statute made it "commercially impracticable"
to mine "certain coal" in the areas affected by the Kohler
Act.
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 484. That Penn Central's balancing test was
itself derived from Pennsylvania Coal has seemingly been over-
looked by most scholars. But see George Skouras, TAKINGS LAW
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Justice Brennan advanced the clearest statement of the equivalence
(indeed, the virtual identity) of the standards set out in the two cases
in his Nollan dissent.
Our phraseology may differ slightly from case to case-
e.g., regulation must "substantially advance," Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), or be "reasonably
necessary to," Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127, (1978), the government's
end. These minor differences cannot, however, obscure
the fact that the inquiry in each case is the same.62
More recently, Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Lucas provided
a further refutation of the view that Agins' first prong marked a de-
parture from the Court's established takings jurisprudence:
"'[h]armful or noxious use' analysis was, in other words, simply the
progenitor of our more contemporary statements that "land-use regu-
lation does not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legiti-
mate state interests.",
63
The doctrinal equivalence of Penn Central and Agins is acknowl-
edged by the more perceptive critics of the substantial advancement
standard, 64 but this only serves to shift their objections back a step--
AND THE SUPREME COURT: JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF THE
REGULATORY STATE'S ACQUISITION, USE AND CONTROL OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY 117 (1998) ("Justice Holmes, working through balancing
tests, established a set of criteria that continue unabated until this
day... The criteria in Pennsylvania Coal were refined in Penn Cen-
tral. ").
62. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 845
(1987) (Brennan, J. dissenting) (emphasis added).
63. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1023-24 (1992).
64. See, e.g., Echeverria, supra note 8, at 855 (footnotes omitted):
More than twenty years ago, in Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. New York City (Penn Central), the Court
stated that "a use restriction may constitute a 'taking' if
[it is] not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a
substantial government purpose." Two years later, in
Agins v. City of Tiburon, the Court said essentially the
same thing: a government action "effects a taking" if it
"does not substantially advance legitimate state inter-
ests."
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to Penn Central itself,65 or in extreme cases, all the way back to
Pennsylvania Coal.66 With this shift, however, their project be-
comes both more heroic and less plausible. If Agins' first prong
were, as is sometimes supposed, an isolated anomaly, it is arguably
not too far-fetched to suppose that the Court might be persuaded it
was a doctrinal error-that the whole thing was, indeed, just a "mis-
take.",67 But when we realize we are dealing with a standard that is
deeply ingrained into the high court's entire corpus of regulatory
Id.
65. See, e.g., id. at 857-58:
In Penn Central, the Court relied upon due process, not
takings, precedents to support the idea that "a use restric-
tion may constitute a 'taking' if [it is] not reasonably nec-
essary to the effectuation of a substantial government
purpose." Specifically, the Penn Central Court cited
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, which involved a due proc-
ess challenge to a zoning regulation in which the owner
alleged that the restriction did "not bear a substantial rela-
tionship to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare." Nectow patently was not a takings case, but in-
stead involved a due process claim that the ordinance
"deprived [the owner] of his property without due process
of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment."
See also Edward J. Sullivan & Carrie Richter, Out of the Chaos:
Towards a National System of Land-use Procedures, 34 URB. LAW.
449, 472 (2002) ("[T]he three- part test of substantive due process
found in Lawton v. Steele can now be found either in the three-factor
test of Penn Central or the two-part test of Agins."); John D.
Echeverria, Is the Penn Central Three-Factor Test Ready for His-
tory's Dustbin?, 52 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIGEST 1:3 (Jan. 2000).
66. See, e.g., Edward J. Sullivan, Return of the Platonic Guardi-
ans: Nollan and Dolan and the First Prong of Agins, 34 URB. LAW.
39, 44-45 (2002) ("There is considerable argument as to whether
Agins incorporated some or all of the tests of Penn Central, but
whether this means the first two of the Penn Central tests, or all
three, or none of them, the crucial point is that it is a test that surely
stems from a natural law philosophy of property rights, which has
provided the ultimate justification for the Court's takings jurispru-
dence since Pennsylvania Coal."); Byrne, supra note 39.
67. See supra, note 24.
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takings law, even the most elegant appeals for doctrinal revision be-
gin to fade under the weight of Michael Berger's eminently practical
observation that, "the Court seems content to have us all live with
it."' 68 This is especially true, given that the Court has quite recently
been directly presented with an opportunity to reconsider the role of
its substantial advancement test, and pointedly declined to do so.
B. The Court "Just Says No" to the Solicitor General
All of the arguments against the application of the substantial ad-
vancement test to takings claims have been regularly placed before
the Supreme Court, in briefs filed by parties appearing before the
Court as well as by amici curiae, but have uniformly been rebuffed.69
The most dramatic instance occurred in the 1997 term, when the So-
licitor General of the United States filed an amicus brief in City of
68. Michael M. Berger, The Taking Issue: Where We Were and
Where We Are Now, ALI-ABA Continuing Legal Education Aug.
22-24, 2002: Land Use Institute: Planning, Regulation, Litigation,
Eminent Domain and Compensation, SH018 433,437 (2002).
69. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents, Palazzolo v. State of Rhode
Island, 2001 WL 22908 (Jan. 3, 2001) (No. 99-2047), at *29 n.43
(asserting that the substantial advancement test is subject to the same
"rational basis" review as due process claim); Brief of the City and
County of San Francisco as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respon-
dents, Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Wash-
ington, 2002 WL 31405606 (Oct. 18, 2002) (No. 01-1325), at *10
(asserting that a "five-Justice majority in Eastern Enterprises" had
relegated the substantial advancement standard to a due process in-
quiry); Brief Amicus Curiae of National Audubon Society, Natural
Resources Defense Council, National Wildlife Federation and Sierra
Club in Support of Respondents, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 2001 WL 1597737 (Nov. 13,
2001) (No. 00-1167), at *15 (asserting there is a "real question"
whether the substantial advancement takings test even exists);
Amicus Brief of the Board of County Commissioners of the County
of La Plata, Colorado in Support of the Respondents State of Rhode
Island, et al., Palazzolo v. State of Rhode Island, 2001 WL 15620
(Jan. 3, 2001) (No. 99-2047), at *4-*7 (asserting that the sole test for
a regulatory taking should be "whether the regulation eliminates all
reasonable use of the property").
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Monterey, imploring the high court to repudiate the use of Agins'
first prong in takings cases, and instead to relegate it to a due process
inquiry.
70
The Solicitor General's challenge was unquestionably a significant
test of the Court's commitment to the substantial advancement doc-
trine. Unlike many lower courts,71 the Supreme Court has no rule
barring the raising of new issues by an amicus, 7 2 and indeed, the
ripeness standards enunciated in Williamson County73 originated in
an amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court by the Solicitor Gen-
eral.74
70. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner in Part, City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,
LEXIS 1997 U.S. Briefs 1235 (No. 97-1235).
71. See, e.g., Keating v. State of Florida ex rel. Ausebel, 157
So.2d 567, 569 (Fla. App. 1963) (an amicus "is not at liberty to in-
ject new issues in a proceeding."); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit.
22, § 500.11 ("Issues not before the courts below may not be raised
for the first time by an amicus."); Ellyn J. Bullock, Acid Rain Falls
on the Just and the Unjust: Why Standing's Criteria Should Not Be
Incorporated into Intervention of Right, 1990 UNIV. ILL. L. REV.
605, 640 n.334 ("Amicus curiae cannot raise new issues.").
72. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994) ("Al-
though we will consider arguments raised only in an amicus brief,
we are reluctant to do so when the issue is one of first impression
involving the interpretation of a federal statute on which the De-
partment of Justice expressly declines to take a position", citing
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989) (considering question
raised only in amicus brief of Criminal Justice Legal Foundation)).
73. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
74. See Brief of Amicus Curiae United States, Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
at 12, 473 U.S. 172 (1984) (No. 84-4). See also Gideon Kanner,
Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court
Been Competent in its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Tak-
ings Law?, 30 URB. L. 307, 330 (1998) (criticizing the Solicitor
General's argument.); R. Marlin Smith, The Hamilton Bank Deci-
sion: Regulatory Inverse Condemnation Claims Encounter Some
New Obstacles, 29 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 8 (1985),
quoted in J. David Breemer, Overcoming Williamson County's
Troubling State Procedures Rule: How the England Reservation,
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In City of Monterey, the Solicitor General asked the Court to ad-
dress the question, "[w]hether a land-use restriction that does not
substantially advance a legitimate public purpose can be deemed, on
that basis alone, to effect a taking of property requiring the payment
of just compensation. 75 Urging the Court to answer that question in
the negative, the Solicitor General argued that "land-use regulation
that bears no reasonable relationship to any valid governmental pur-
pose violates principles of substantive due process, but it cannot be
said (on that basis alone) to effect a compensable taking of prop-
erty.''76 The Solicitor General's City of Monterey brief has been
aptly described as a "defiant rejection ' 77 of the Supreme Court's
reliance on Agins in Nollan and Dolan, as well as the Ninth Circuit's
application of those decisions in City of Monterey.
In what can only be regarded as a stunning setback for critics of
the substantial advancement standard, the Supreme Court brusquely
swept aside the Solicitor General's arguments and reiterated the gen-
eral applicability of Agins' first prong to regulatory takings claims.78
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion referred to the trial court's ap-
plication of the test to find a taking resulting from a permit denial as
"consistent with our previous general discussions of regulatory tak-
ings liability. ' ' 79 He then cited to seven Supreme Court takings cases
employing the substantial advancement standard over a span of 14
years before concluding, "we decline the suggestions of amici to
revisit these precedents." 80
Given the City of Monterey Court's unusually forceful rebuff to the
Solicitor General's arguments, together with its ratification of the
Issue Preclusion Exceptions, and the Inadequacy Exception Open
the Federal Courthouse Door to Ripe Takings Claims, 18 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 209, 215 n.42 (2003).
75. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States, Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
at *1, 473 U.S. 172 (1984) (No. 84-4).
76. Id. at *28.
77. Douglas W. Kmiec, Book Review: Property and Economic
Liberty as Civil Rights: The Magisterial History of James W. Ely,
Jr., 52 VAND. L. REv. 737, 746 (1999).
78. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 704
(1999).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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use of Agins' first prong on the facts of that case and its express af-
firmation of the use of the standard in prior decisions, the substantial
advancement test seems firmly established as a core element of the
Supreme Court's takings-not due process-jurisprudence.
II. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS HAVE AFFIRMED THE
CONTINUED VITALITY OF THE SUBSTANTIAL ADVANCEMENT
TAKINGS TEST
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's repeated affirmation and ap-
plication of the substantial advancement takings test, some commen-
tators have read the Court's recent opinions as signaling a with-
drawal from this standard. Such an interpretation is unwarranted, as
can be seen by a review of three regulatory takings decisions handed• • 81
down over the past six years: Eastern Enterprises,1 City of Monter-
ey82 and Tahoe-Sierra.
83
A. Eastern Enterprises Did Not Undermine the General Applicabil-
ity of the Substantial Advancement Test to Regulatory Takings
Claims
Critics of the substantial advancement standard have most force-
fully advanced Eastern Enterprises in support of the claim that the
Court favors relegating Agins' first prong to a substantive due proc-
84
ess standard. However, the highly fragmented Eastern Enterprises
decision cannot bear this much weight, both because of the unique
characteristics of that case and because subsequent Supreme Court
opinions do not support such an interpretation.
Eastern Enterprises involved a challenge to the Coal Industry Re-
tiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, under both the Takings and Due
Process Clauses.85 At issue was the law's retroactive imposition of
81. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
82. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
83. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
84. See, e.g., Echeverria, supra note 8, at 866-68; see also Brief of
Appellants, Chevron USA, Inc., v. Cayetano, United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, (2004) (No. 02-15867), at 15 (finding
Eastern Enterprises to be "dispositive" in relegating the substantial
advancement test to substantive due process).
85. See 524 U.S. at 503-04.
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liability to fund benefits under the Act. Although Eastern Enter-
prises had not been directly involved in coal mining operations since
1967, and had owned no mining-related subsidiaries since 1987, it
would be liable under the terms of the Act for assessments of $50-
$100 million to fund benefits to retired miners who had been em-
ployed by Eastern prior to 1966.86
Justice O'Connor, writing for a four-Justice plurality, 87 found the
statute's creation of retroactive financial liability unconstitutional
under the Takings Clause. The plurality opinion did not cite to
Agins, nor did it decide the case under the substantial advancement
standard. Instead, Justice O'Connor applied a straightforward Penn
Central analysis, finding that the Act imposed heavy economic bur-
dens that could not reasonably have been foreseen,88 and that the
character of the regulation was such that it "singles out certain em-
ployers" 89 based on long-past activities, thereby "implicat[ing] fun-
damental principles of fairness underlying the Takings Clause." 90
Concurring in the result, Justice Kennedy agreed that the Coal Act
was unconstitutional as applied to Eastern Enterprises, but stated
that he would strike it down "as contrary to essential due process
principles, without regard to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. 9 The crux of Justice Kennedy's concern was that the Coal
Act did not directly impinge upon any identifiable property interest:
[The Act] regulates the former mine owner without re-
gard to property. It does not operate upon or alter an iden-
tified property interest, and it is not applicable to or
measured by a property interest. The Coal Act does not
appropriate, transfer, or encumber an estate in land (e.g.,
a lien on a particular piece of property), a valuable inter-
est in an intangible (e.g., intellectual property), or even a
bank account or accrued interest. The law simply imposes
an obligation to perform an act, the payment of benefits.92
86. See id. at 529.
87. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas
joined in the plurality opinion.
88. 524 U.S. at 529-32.
89. Id. at 537.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 539 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dis-
senting in part).
92. Id. at 540.
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Without a direct link between the impact of the law and "a specific
property right or interest" 93 protected by the Fifth Amendment, Jus-
tice Kennedy felt the Takings Clause was not implicated. In this
context, he worried that "[t]he imprecision of our regulatory takings
doctrine does open the door to normative considerations about the
wisdom of government decisions." 94 Of course, Agins did involve
governmental interference with a traditional, constitutionally cogni-
zable property interest. In any case, since the plurality had neither
cited nor relied upon Agins, the significance of this single, passing
reference to the case in Justice Kennedy's concurrence is far from
clear.
Writing in dissent for himself and three others,95 Justice Breyer
agreed with Justice Kennedy that "[tihe Constitution's Takings
Clause does not apply."96 Like Justice Kennedy, the dissenters were
troubled by the plurality's application of the Takings Clause to a
case that "involves not an interest in physical or intellectual prop-
erty, but an ordinary liability to pay money, and not to the Govern-
ment, but to third parties. 97
Also like Justice Kennedy, the dissenters worried that under these
circumstances, the Takings Clause "bristles with conceptual difficul-
ties" 98-yet Justice Breyer did not expressly criticize (or even men-
tion) Agins or the substantial advancement standard. Instead, the
dissent inquired whether the Coal Act's application to Eastern vio-
lated the Due Process Clause (as Eastern had alleged), and deter-
mined that it did not.
99
The peculiar facts that gave rise to Eastern Enterprise resulted in a
unique decision-four members of the Court found the Coal Act's
application to Eastern violated the Takings Clause, another four
found it did not violate the Due Process Clause, and the ninth Justice
disagreed with both sides! As a result, most courts and analysts have
concluded that Eastern Enterprises has no precedential value at
93. Id. at541.
94. Id. at 545.
95. Justice Breyer's dissent was joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg.
96. Id. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 556.
99. See id. at 558-68.
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all. l°° The case has plausibly been cited for the proposition that "a
regulation must relate to a specific interest for the Takings Clause to
apply,"'' and for the more specific understanding that regulations
imposing only generalized financial liabilities are unlikely to be
struck down as takings. 1°2 However, the decision provides no sup-
port for such generalizations as "a majority of the Supreme Courthas backed away from [Agins' first prong] as a standard of takings
100. See, e.g., Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 658
(3rd Cir. 1999) ("The splintered nature of the Court makes it difficult
to distill a guiding principle from Eastern."); Franklin County Con-
vention Facilities Auth. v. Amer. Premiere Underwriters, Inc., 240
F.3d 534, 552 (6th Cir. 2001) ("Eastern Enterprises has no prece-
dential effect"). See also Edward J. Sullivan & Nicholas Cropp,
Making It Up-"Original Intent" and Federal Takings Jurispru-
dence, 35 URB. LAW. 203, 253 (2003) ("[B]ecause of the division of
opinion among the Justices, Eastern Enterprises may not be author-
ity for any particular proposition."); Echeverria, supra note 7, at
1059 ("Technically, Eastern Enterprises has no precedential value
because the Court could not agree upon a single rationale for the
result."); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Allure of Consequential Fit,
51 ALA. L. REV. 1261, 1261 n.2 ("Most lower courts have concluded
that, given the failure of five Justices to agree on an approach, East-
ern Enterprises provides no precedential value.").
101. Florida Rock Industries, Inc., v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21,
42 n.13 (1999).
102. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 F.3d
1327, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (under Eastern Enterprises, "the Tak-
ings Clause does not apply to legislation requiring the payment of
money"); see also Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and
Regulatory Takings: A Reappraisal, 51 ALA. L. REV. 977, 989
(2000) ("Eastern Enterprises involves not specific property rights,
but rather the imposition of a monetary burden that constitutes a
general obligation."); Michael M. Berger, Property Rights and Tak-
ings Law: Y2K and Beyond, in 2002 PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE
ON PLANNING, ZONING, & EMINENT DOMAIN, chap. 4, at 4-15 ("It
seemed clear to this author that Justice Kennedy's vote in Eastern
was related to the fact that the case concerned cash, rather than land,
and that he viewed land cases differently.").
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liability" " 3-and subsequent high court opinions have confirmed
that such an interpretation is unfounded.
B. City of Monterey Upheld a Finding of a Regulatory Taking
Under the Substantial Advancement Standard
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Eastern Enterprises cannot be con-
strued as a general rejection of the substantial advancement takings
standard. This is evident from the opinion of the Court he drafted
just eleven months later in City of Monterey.1 4 In City of Monterey,
a property owner brought a regulatory takings suit based on the
city's repeated, unreasonable denials of development permits.
1 5
The case went to a jury on a strange amalgam of Agins and Lucas:
the trial court instructed the panel that takings liability should be
found either if the permit denials deprived the owner of all economi-
cally viable use of the property' 0 6 or if the city's actions did not
"substantially advance a legitimate public purpose."'10 7 As a practi-
cal matter, only the latter criterion provided a realistic basis for tak-
ings liability, since the plaintiffs had sold the regulated property for
$4.5 million.0 8 The jury returned a general verdict of liability, 09 in
103. Kendall, Dowling & Schwartz, supra note 24, at 232.
104. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
105. See id. at 695-98.
106. See id. at 700.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Nancy E. Stroud, Del Monte Dunes v. City of Mon-
terey: How Far Does It Limit "Rough Proportionality" Analysis in
Land Use Cases?, 14 PROB. & PROP. 6, 8 (Sep.-Oct. 2000). The
Supreme Court originally equated the "denial of economically viable
use" prong of Agins with the ability to receive a reasonable rate of
return on investment. See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.6 (1978). On this view, Del Monte Dunes
might have suffered a second-prong taking if the $4.5 million it re-
ceived for the property constituted less than a competitive return on
its invested capital. Since Lucas, however, Agins' second prong has
generally been merged with the categorical takings standard of de-
nial of all economically viable use, making a finding of takings li-
ability on this ground extremely unlikely on the facts of City of Mon-
terey. See, e.g., NJD, Ltd., v. City of San Dimas, 110 Cal. App. 4th
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effect finding a compensable taking because the city's successive
denials of the plaintiffs permit applications failed to substantially
advance legitimate governmental interests. 110
In affirming the finding of a taking, Justice Kennedy's opinion for
the Court repeatedly expressed its satisfaction with the jury instruc-
tions, and with the substantial advancement inquiry serving as the
basis for takings liability."1 This is especially significant because
one of the questions on which the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in City of Monterey was "whether the Court of Appeals impermissi-
bly based its decision on a standard that allowed the jury to reweigh
the reasonableness of the city's land-use decision"" 2-a common,
albeit inaccurate, characterization of Agins' first prong." 3 The Su-
preme Court's answer to the City of Monterey's question was clear:
"the trial court's instructions are consistent with our previous gen-
1428, 1437-38 (2003) (speculating whether the Lucas Court meant
to supersede Agins' second prong with a categorical test).
109. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 701.
110. See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker & John M. Payne, PLANNING
AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 119
(5th ed. 2001) (The City of Monterey trial court "essentially put the
case to the jury on the first prong of Agins, and because it was a gen-
eral verdict, it had to be presumed that the jury had decided on this
theory.").
111. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 702-07.
112. Id. at 702
113. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Judicial Activism in the Regulatory
Takings Opinions of Justice Scalia, 1 GEORGETOWN J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y. 93, 94 (2002) (characterizing Nollan's heightened scrutiny
requirement as "permit[ting] judicial supervision of the wisdom of
legislative and administrative judgments"); S. Keith Garner,
"Novel" Constitutional Claims: Rent Control, Means-ends Tests,
and the Takings Clause, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1547, 1548 (2000) (de-
scribing California Supreme Court's rejection of the substantial ad-
vancement test, ostensibly because "the role of the courts is not to
second-guess the wisdom of the legislature"). The same mischarac-
terization has been applied to Penn Central's "character of the gov-
ernment action" prong. See John D. Echeverria, Do Partial Regula-
tory Takings Exist?, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES 223, 236 (Thomas E. Roberts, ed.,
2002).
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eral discussions of regulatory takings liability. "'114 In other words,
Eastern Enterprises notwithstanding, Justice Kennedy's opinion in
City of Monterey expressly reiterated the high court's traditional un-
derstanding that takings liability may properly be grounded on the
failure of land-use regulations to substantially advance legitimate
state interests, going so far as to characterize this as "the general test
for regulatory takings liability."
'
"
15
Most analysts, including a number of prominent Takings Clause
doves, have acknowledged that City of Monterey reaffirms the sub-
stantial advancement test as a central element of the Supreme
Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence.' 16 The few exceptions ap-
peared to be grasping at straws to maintain their position that the
Court had turned away from the substantial advancement test:
[T]he force of the precedent set in Eastern Enterprises is
not undermined by the Court's 1999 decision in City of
114. 526 U.S. at 704 (emphasis added).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental
About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REv.
703, 720 n.89 (2000) ("The ruling in favor of the property owner in
City of Monterey is especially significant because it represents the
first occasion that the Court has ever upheld a regulatory takings
claim based just on the so-called first prong of the regulatory takings
test announced in Agins v. City of Tiburon.); Edward H. Ziegler, De-
velopment Exactions and Permit Decisions: The Supreme Court's
Nollan, Dolan, and Del Monte Dunes Decisions, 34 URB. LAW. 155,
160 (2002) ("Under Del Monte Dunes, the substantially advance
takings test would seem to be appropriately applied to any permit
denial where the respective facts in context demonstrate that the de-
nial is not reasonably related to the asserted public purposes alleg-
edly supporting the denial."); Robert H. Freilich, Time, Space, and
Value in Inverse Condemnation: A Unified Theory for Partial Tak-
ings Analysis, 24 U. HAw. L. REv. 589, 595 n.33 (2002) ("The first
prong of Agins was recently approved in City of Monterey."); Mark
A. Chertok & Kate Sinding, The Federal Regulation of Wetlands,
Part II: Takings Issues, Swampbuster Program, and Enforcement,
NAAG NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J. 3, 3 (April 2003) ("In City
of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., the Supreme
Court upheld a $1.45 million jury award in a takings case under the
substantial advancement inquiry.").
[VOL. XV
LAND USE REGULATION
Monterey .... [F]ive of the Justices in the case ... either
wrote opinions or joined in opinions reserving the ques-
tion of the validity of the substantially advance test,
thereby indicating that the result in City of Monterey
should not be taken as an endorsement of this test. 
1 17
There is no way to square such arguments with the Court's straight-
forward affirmation of a finding of takings liability under this stan-
dard, or with Justice Kennedy's further reference to "[t]he jury's role
in determining whether a land-use decision substantially advances
legitimate public interests within the meaning of our regulatory tak-
ings doctrine."' 18 Given that these commentators relied on Justice
Kennedy's earlier concurrence in Eastern Enterprises to argue that a
"five-justice majority" of the Court had relegated the substantial ad-
vancement inquiry to a due process standard,' 19 his unequivocal re-
jection of that position in Del Monte Dunes would appear to be fatal
to their argument.
C. Tahoe-Sierra Expressly Reaffirmed the Substantial Advancement
Test as a Regulatory Taking Standard
Whatever pretense could be maintained after City of Monterey that
the Supreme Court had rejected the substantial advancement test was
laid to rest in the Court's most recent regulatory takings decision,
Tahoe-Sierra. 12 There, the four Eastern Enterprises dissenters who,with Justice Kennedy, have been counted as a "majority" supposedly
117. Echeverria, supra note 47, at 10628 n.25. See also Kendall,
Dowling & Schwartz, supra note 24, at 235 (City of Monterey
"stands as the first ruling in which the Supreme Court affirmed an
award of just compensation for a regulatory taking in a land use
case, and yet no Member of the Court was willing to embrace the
means-end theory of liability included in the jury instruction that
gave rise to the award.").
118. City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 721.
119. See, e.g., Kendall, Dowling & Schwartz, supra note 24, at
232; Echeverria, supra note 8, at 866-67.
120. 535 U.S. 302 (2001).
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rejecting the substantial advancement test, 12 1 expressly endorsed that
standard in a majority opinion penned by Justice Stevens.'EE
At issue in Tahoe-Sierra was whether a temporary development
moratorium that eliminated all beneficial use of the plaintiffs' home
sites for a period of years constituted a categorical taking under Lu-
cas. 12 3 A majority of the Court held that it did not. 124 Nevertheless,
Justice Stevens went on to explain that such a moratorium could give
rise to liability as a regulatory taking under any of seven alternative
theories, including the "[s]ixth, apart from the District Court's find-
ing that TRPA's actions represented a proportional response to a
serious risk of harm to the lake, petitioners might have argued that
the moratoria did not substantially advance a legitimate state inter-
est, see Agins and Monterey."' 125 By not only specifically setting out
Agins' first prong as a takings theory applicable to development
moratoria, but also citing City of Monterey as authority for its use,
Justice Stevens appears to be deliberately driving a stake through the
heart of the argument that the Court has backed away from this stan-
dard. As one commentator noted, "[in light of this statement, the
suggestion by some commentators that Agins' substantial advance-
ment test is not viable as an independent takings standard must be
viewed with considerable skepticism." 12
6
Most of the Takings Clause doves apparently agree, or have at
least fallen silent on this question since Tahoe-Sierra. The sole ex-
121. See Kendall, Dowling & Schwartz, supra note 24, at 232;
Echeverria, supra note 8, at 866-67.
122. 535 U.S. at 305. Justice Stevens' Opinion of the Court in Ta-
hoe-Sierra was joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter,
Breyer, and Ginsburg.
123. See id. at 306.
124. See id. at 321-30.
125. Id. at 334 (emphasis added).
126. J. David Breemer, Temporary Insanity: The Long Tale of Ta-
hoe-Sierra Preservation Council and its Quiet Ending in the United
States Supreme Court, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 22 n. 136 (2002). See
Douglas W. Kmiec, 2 ZONING & PLAN. DESKBOOK § 7:21 (2d ed.
Feb. 2004) ("As the [Tahoe-Sierra] majority suggests, practitioners
need to remember that an as-applied partial/temporary taking is still
possible for deprivation of some significant use or failure to sub-
stantially advance its regulatory objective.") (emphasis added).
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ception appears to be John Echeverria, who continues to insist that
the issue is in doubt:
Because the district court rejected the substantially ad-
vance claim, and the plaintiffs did not appeal on that is-
sue, the Court had no reason in Tahoe-Sierra to address
the legitimacy of this test. The Court observed that the
plaintiffs "might have argued that the moratoria did not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest," but it
said that this claim, too, was foreclosed by the district
court findings. Again the Court has not provided much
direction one way or the other, leaving the validity of this
ostensible takings test for resolution in some subsequent
case. 127
In terms of the realities of Supreme Court doctrine, this position is
simply not tenable after Tahoe-Sierra. In the half-decade since the
Court's opaque and fragmented decision in Eastern Enterprises,
every Justice has written or joined opinions applying, upholding, or
expressly affirming the general applicability of the substantial ad-
vancement test to regulatory takings. Predicting the future direction
of the Court from the current views of its individual members is an
inexact art at best. 128 Nevertheless, as of its last major land-use tak-
ings decision, the Court is unanimous in its agreement that a land use
regulation that fails to substantially advance legitimate state interests
does result in a regulatory taking.129
127. Echeverria, supra note 44, at 11250.
128. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Counting Votes and Discounting
Holdings in the Supreme Court's Takings Cases, 38 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1099 (1997); see also Maxwell L. Stearns, CONSTITUTIONAL
PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT
DECISION MAKING (2000) (describing and seeking to explain anoma-
lies in the Court's jurisprudence arising from the collective decision-
making process).
129. After recently reviewing the arguments for relegating the sub-
stantial advancement test to a due process standard, the Texas Su-
preme Court pointedly commented:
Whatever may be made of all of this, one thing is clear:
the Supreme Court has never modified or retracted its
statement in Agins. Prior decisions need not be reaf-
firmed periodically to retain authority. As the Supreme
Court has admonished:
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III. REGULATORY TAKINGS CLAIMS BROUGHT UNDER THE
SUBSTANTIAL ADVANCEMENT STANDARD MUST RECEIVE A HIGHER
LEVEL OF JUDICIAL REVIEW THAN SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
CLAIMS-AND WHY IT MATrERS
As a corollary to their efforts to relegate the "substantial advance-
ment" takings test to the realm of due process, some Takings Clause
doves also seek to undermine the level of scrutiny required by the
Supreme Court in regulatory takings cases. 13 Paralleling the argu-
ment concerning the substantial advancement test itself, it has even
been asserted that the Supreme Court invoked heightened scrutiny
under this standard by mistake.' 31 Some of these critics simply col-
lapse their opposition to the heightened scrutiny requirement into
their argument concerning the substantial advancement test itself,132
"[ilf a precedent of [the Supreme] Court has direct appli-
cation in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in
some other line of decisions, [a lower court] should fol-
low the case which directly controls, leaving to [the Su-
preme] Court the prerogative of overruling its own deci-
sions."
Sheffield Dev. Co., Inc. v. City of Glenn Heights, 2004 WL 422594,
(Mar. 5, 2004) (No. 02-0033) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203, 237 (1997)).
130. See, e.g., Kendall, Dowling & Schwartz, supra note 24, at 8
(citing Nollan for the proposition that the Supreme Court applies the
same degree of deference to takings claims as to substantive due
process[!]).
131. See Echeverria, supra note 8, at 865-66 (contending that the
Supreme Court inadvertently applied the standard of review from
pre-New Deal due process cases, not realizing heightened scrutiny of
due process claims had been abandoned in the 1930s).
132. See, e.g., Echeverria, supra note 44, at 11247 ("the most fun-
damental reason to reject the view that takings law authorizes a gen-
eral inquiry into the fundamental fairness of government action is
that this approach threatens to revive a discredited, highly intrusive
type of judicial scrutiny."); Sullivan, supra note 66, at 41 (complain-
ing that the Ninth Circuit in Chevron, USA v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d
1030 (9th Cir. 2000), "persisted with an analysis that, if followed,
would appear to transform what would otherwise be 'rational basis'
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment into substantive review of
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going so far as to claim that both were rejected in Eastern Enter-
prises.133 As we have already seen, however, the position that the
Supreme Court has abandoned Agins' first prong as a regulatory tak-
ings standard is untenable, given that every member of the Court
endorsed its use in that context in either City of Monterey or Tahoe-
Sierra.134 The argument that Eastern Enterprises mandated deferen-
tial, rational-basis review of substantial advancement claims is even
more tenuous, since it contradicts the Court's plain language in Nol-
lan's footnote 3:
[O]ur opinions do not establish that [takings] standards
are the same as those applied to due process or equal pro-
tection claims. To the contrary... [w]e have required that
the regulation "substantially advance" the "legitimate
state interest" sought to be achieved, not that "the State
'could rationally have decided' that the measure adopted
might achieve the State's objective."' 135
Obviously, substantial advancement takings claims cannot both be
subjected to deferential review and be expressly distinguished from
the level of scrutiny "applied [in] due process or equal protection
claims. ' 36 As was true with respect to the substantial advancement
test itself, the arguments against heightened scrutiny of regulatory
takings claims have frequently been presented to the Supreme Court,
but without success. 137 Despite the zealous objections of counsel for
the likely effectiveness of the regulation under the Fifth Amend-
ment").
133. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the City and County of San
Francisco in Support of Appellants and for Reversal of the Judg-
ment, Chevron USA, Inc. v. Cayetano, United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, No. 02-15867, at 9 ("The Court's recent
decisions [in Eastern Enterprises and City of Monterey] indicate that
deferential review is appropriate for legislative regulations.").
134. See supra text and accompanying notes 104-29.
135. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 n.3
(1987) (citations omitted).
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of League for Coastal Protec-
tion, Planning and Conservation League, Center for Marine Conser-
vation, Chesapeake Bay Foundation, National Trust for Historic
Preservation, National Wildlife Federation, and Sierra Club in Sup-
port of Respondents, City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 1998
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cities, counties, and states, and the Solicitor General, the Court has
firmly refused to reconsider the heightened standard of review it
mandated for regulatory takings claims over 15 years ago.
The import of Nollan's footnote 3 has been clear to most commen-
tators virtually since the day the decision was handed down.' 38 Even
WL 297461 (U.S.) *4 (arguing that heightened scrutiny applies only
to permanent physical invasions); Brief for Respondent, Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 1994 WL 123754 (U.S) *24 (arguing that Nollan did
not disturb the deferential standard of review of land-use regula-
tions); Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari,
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Ange-
les County, No. 89-826, at 26-27 (arguing that Nollan's heightened
scrutiny applies only to conveyances of real property).
138. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Wilcox, Taking Cover: Fifth Amendment
Takings Jurisprudence as a Tool for Resolving Water Disputes in the
American West, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 493 (2003) ("Justice Scalia's
standard [in Nollan] is substantially less deferential to the states than
Justice Brennan's, and a far cry indeed from the indirect relationship
test formerly applied by the California state courts."); Jess Hofber-
ger, The Growing Conflict Between the Endangered Species Act and
Federal Takings Law: Who Must Pay the Price for Protection?, 23 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 295, 301 (2003) ("'Substantially
advance' appears to be a term which invites an active judicial review
of the regulation and may require the government to prove the le-
gitimacy of the regulation."); Edward H. Ziegler, Development Ex-
actions and Permit Decisions: The Supreme Court's Nollan, Dolan,
and Del Monte Dunes Decisions, 34 URB. LAW. 155, 157-58 (2002)
("This 'substantially advance' taking test was construed by the Su-
preme Court as a general standard for judicial review of takings
claims; it is different from and apparently more stringent than, the
traditional due process 'minimum rationality' test for constitutional-
ity."); J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the "Essential Nexus":
How State and Federal Courts Have Applied Nollan and Dolan and
Where They Should Go from Here, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 373,
374-75 ("Although there has always been some disagreement about
the crux of [Nollan and Dolan] . . . the cases at least seemed to call
for increased judicial scrutiny of land use conditions."); Mark W.
Cordes, Legal Limits on Development Exactions: Responding to Nol-
lan and Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 513, 534 (1995) (noting that
the Dolan "Court's analysis demonstrated a seriousness of review to
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protect unjustified intrusions on property interests); Douglas T.
Kendall & James E. Ryan, "Paying" for the Change: Using Eminent
Domain to Secure Exactions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 VA.
L. REV. 1801, 1862 (1995) ("Whether a regulation substantially ad-
vances a legitimate state interest involves an inquiry that is similar, if
not identical, to the substantive due process inquiry. If Nollan's
heightened scrutiny were applied to all land-use regulations, then
presumably a court would look more closely at the reasons for deny-
ing the permit under a regulatory takings inquiry than under due
process."); Page Carroccia Dringman, Regulatory Takings: The
Search for a Definitive Standard, 55 MONT. L. REV. 245, 253 (1994)
(Nollan "signaled the United States Supreme Court's movement
away from a 'rubber stamp' or superficial application of the rational
basis test to a more rigorous standard of review."); William C. Leigh
& Bruce W. Burton, Predatory Governmental Zoning Practices and
the Supreme Court's New Takings Clause Formulation: Timing,
Value, and R.LB.E., 1993 BYU L. REV. 827, 840 n.65 ("In both Nol-
lan and Lucas, the Court made it clear that heightened judicial scru-
tiny will be applied when property rights are being significantly di-
minished by regulation or exaction."); Dwight C. Hirsh, IV., Yee v.
City of Escondido-A Rejection of the Ninth Circuit's Unique Physi-
cal Takings Theory Opens the Gates for Mobile Home Park Owners'
Regulatory Takings Claims, 24 PAC. L.J. 1681, 1693 n.82 (1993)
("[T]he Nollan Court applied what has traditionally been called ei-
ther 'mid-level,' 'intermediate,' or 'heightened' scrutiny."); James
W. Ely, Jr., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 148 (1992) ("The
Nollan decision alarmed land use regulators because it signaled a
heightened degree of judicial supervision."); Cotton C. Harness, I1.,
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Its Historic Context and
Shifting Constitutional Principles, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 5, 17
(1992) ("Between the demise of Lochner and [the Nollan] decision,
the Court's review of the rationality of state exercise of police power
was based upon a presumption of rationality .... [In Nollan] Justice
Scalia disregards this time-honored deference to legislative decision
making and replaces it with a test that requires greater judicial scru-
tiny."); Steven J. Eagle and William H. Mellor III, Regulatory Tak-
ings After the Supreme Court's 1991-92 Term: An Evolving Return
to Property Rights, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 209, 237 (1992) ("Nollan
seems totally inconsistent with the deference to the legislature that
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such a dedicated Takings Clause dove as Professor Williams has
acknowledged the Court's mandate of heightened scrutiny under the
substantial advancement standard: "[i]n Nollan, the Court ... inter-
pret[ed] the fifth amendment's Takings Clause as requiring aggres-
sive judicial review of police power regulations affecting fundamen-
tal rights in private property."
Some scholars have likened the standard of review under Agins'
first prong to that for First Amendment violations:
[Nollan's footnote 3] suggests that courts should apply
heightened judicial scrutiny when they review land-use
ordinances and decisions for Taking Clause violations.
Echoing the judicial review standard applied to land uses
claimed to violate the free speech clause, Justice Scalia
held that land-use regulations must "substantially ad-
vance" a "legitimate state interest" to avoid a violation of
the Taking Clause. This test, Justice Scalia explained, is
stricter than the standard of judicial review that is applied
marks the 'conceivable basis' test. As previously discussed, Nol-
lan's 'sufficient nexus' holding is in itself an invocation of height-
ened scrutiny."); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of
the Takings Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLuM. L. REV.
1630, 1649 (1988) (noting that Nollan calls for "heightened interme-
diate scrutiny" of the government's "means").
139. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Legal Discourse, Social Vision and
the Supreme Court's Land Use Planning Law: The Genealogy of the
Lochnerian Recurrence in First English Lutheran Church and Nol-
lan, 59 U. CoLO. L. REV. 427, 463 (1988). See also, e.g., Edward H.
Ziegler, Development Exactions and Permit Decisions: The Supreme
Court's Nollan, Dolan, and Del Monte Dunes Decisions, 34 URB.
LAW. 155, 158-59 (2002):
A number of recent court decisions now have construed
the substantially advance test to require a level of judicial
scrutiny for zoning and other land- use restrictions higher
than the modern "minimum rationality" due process test
for constitutionality. The substantially advance test has
been held to require a real examination of "the nexus be-
tween the effect of the ordinance and the legitimate state
interest it is supposed to advance." The test has been ap-
plied both to legislative restrictions and permit denials.
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under the substantive due process and equal protection
claims. 1
40
More commonly, however, the standard is interpreted as requiring
mid-level scrutiny:
To satisfy Agins, a law must "substantially" advance "le-
gitimate" state interests. This heightened judicial review
is opposite the standard of review employed when a court
considers whether a taking is for a "public use" (i.e., a
public purpose) within the Takings Clause. In Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the Court stated that a
minimum rationality standard is to be used to determine
if a law takes for a public purpose within the meaning of
the Takings Clause. What Agins does, therefore, is to re-
quire intermediate judicial review to see if laws being
challenged under the Takings Clause are for a public pur-
pose, while Hawaii Housing requires minimal rationality
review to see if laws being challenged under the Takings
Clause are for a public purpose.
141
In the face of this widespread recognition of the plain language of
the Supreme Court, some critics have taken the fall-back position
that heightened scrutiny under Agins' first prong is appropriate only
in as-applied challenges to the individualized, administrative appli-
140. Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Pre-
sumption of Constitutionality in Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 13
(1992) (emphasis added) (footnote deleted).
141. Jan G. Laitos, The Takings Clause in America's Industrial
States After Lucas, 20 U. TOL. L. REV. 281, 299 (1993). See Ber-
nard H. Siegan, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS, AND LAND-USE REGULATION 128 (1997) ("In his [Nollan]
opinion, Scalia applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to the facts
of the case, according less deference to the Constitution than would
be warranted under minimal scrutiny."); Steven J. Eagle & William
H. Mellor III, Regulatory Takings After the Supreme Court's 1991-
92 Term: An Evolving Return to Property Rights, 29 CALIF. W. L.
REv. 209, 214 (1992) (noting that the Court applies essentially the
same level of scrutiny to equal protection claims based on gender or
legitimacy classifications).
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cation of land-use regulations. 142 But while this may be a plausible
interpretation of the Court's current use of Dolan's "rough-
proportionality" standard, 143 the substantial advancement test itself,
with its implicit requirement of heightened scrutiny, is equally appli-
cable to facial challenges of legislative enactments.144
The Court's application of heightened scrutiny under Agins' first
prong is not an aberration, nor is it an arbitrary or mistaken append-
age to takings law. Rather, the requirement of an elevated standard
of review is implied by the very existence of a cause of action for
regulatory takings. As the Tahoe-Sierra Court noted, 145 regulatory
takings differ in nature from physical occupations or invasions, ei-
ther directly by the government 146 or by third parties acting under
governmental authority. 147 It is this very difference that gives rise to
the need for heightened scrutiny of regulatory takings claims.
Physical invasions or occupations of private property by the state are
normally obvious to a fact-finder employing even a minimal stan-
dard of review. 14 8 The only question in such cases is whether just
142. See, e.g., Kendall, Dowling & Schwartz, supra note 24, at
244-45 (asserting that "in typical land use cases that do not involve
conipelled dedications, a more deferential standard is appropriate").
143. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 687
(1999).
144. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 530 (1992) (indi-
cating regulatory takings claim under Nollan would lie in facial chal-
lenge to mobile home park rent ordinance); Richardson v. City &
County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150, 1158 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying
substantial advancement test to enactment of condominium rent con-
trol ordinance).
145. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 202, 322-23 (2001).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (air-
craft overflights causing a taking); Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Missis-
sippi Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (flooding causing a taking).
147. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419 (1982) (requiring owner of apartment building to contract
with cable television supplier found to be a taking).
148. See, e.g., Meltz, Merriam, & Frank, supra note 51, at 117
("The permanent physical invasion of private property by the gov-
ernment should be the easiest to recognize .... When permanent,
these intrusions are generally so open and obvious that none of the
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compensation has been paid-again, an inquiry that can be con-
ducted on the level of an evidentiary hearing, without need for prob-
ing review on the part of a court. The situation is completely differ-
ent when the government, inadvertently or by design, accomplishes
the same effect as if it had taken title to private property, but without
acknowledging either the usurpation or the requirement to compen-
sate.149 As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has observed, "[i]t
makes considerable sense to give greater deference to the legislature
where it deliberately resorts to its eminent domain power than where
it may have stumbled into exercising it through actions that inciden-
tally result in a taking."' 50 In the successive two-part inquiries it set
out in Pennsylvania Coal, Penn Central, and Agins, the Supreme
Court has recognized that it is necessary to examine the nature and
impact of challenged regulations to determine whether they are the
functional equivalent of seizures, pressing private property "into
some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious
public harm,"' bl but without payment of compensation. Such an
usual takings tests are used."); Joshua M. Duke & Kristen A. Sen-
toff, Managing Isolated Wetlands After Solid Waste and Tahoe: The
Case of Delaware, 18 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 355, 369 (2003)
("Physical takings are more obvious, and the physical confiscation of
property, no matter how small a part, requires compensation.").
149. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322 n.17 ("When the govern-
ment condemns or physically appropriates the property, the fact of a
taking is typically obvious and undisputed. When, however, the
owner contends a taking has occurred because a law or regulation
imposes restrictions so severe that they are tantamount to a condem-
nation or appropriation, the predicate of a taking is not self-evident,
and the analysis is more complex.").
150. Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1280 n.25 (9th
Cir. 1986) (overruled on other grounds); see also Chevron USA v.
Cayetano, 224 F.3d at 1034 (explaining rationale for higher standard
of review for regulatory than physical takings). Cf. Richardson v.
City and County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d at 1158 ("We see nothing
inconsistent in applying heightened scrutiny when the taking is un-
compensated, and a more deferential standard when the taking is
fully compensated.").
151. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1018 (1992).
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inquiry, virtually by definition, requires going behind the surface of
the regulatory rationale-i.e., requires an elevated level of scrutiny.
Of course, the heightened scrutiny requirement implicit in Agins'
first prong does not flow automatically from the mere invocation of
the standard; applying meaningful review of state action requires an
act of judicial will. This responsibility can easily be evaded; indeed,
the California Supreme Court has made it a matter of judicial policy152
to do just that. The most common way to convert the substantial
advancement standard into deferential review is to characterize it as
merely requiring a rational relationship between regulatory ends and
means. This leads to such absurdities as the holding by a California
court that, because a city's rent control ordinance was intended to
control rents and in fact did so, it thereby complied with the substan-
tial advancement test.1 53 Such an outcome is predictable when the
test is interpreted merely as one of ends-means scrutiny, since re-
quiring a match between regulatory ends and means is just another
way of describing rational basis review. 154
In Nollan, the Supreme Court did inquire into the relationship be-
tween regulatory ends and means.' 55 Far more important, however,
was the Court's emphasis on the need for a close causal nexus be-
tween the burdens imposed by the regulations, and the social costs
that would otherwise be imposed by the property's unregulated
use. 56 As Professor McUsic points out,
[The Nollan] Court described the "substantially advance"
test as one that examines the proportionate relationship
between the amount of public harm caused by the owner
152. See, e.g., Santa Monica Beach Ltd., v. Superior Court, 968
P.2d 993, 1001 (Cal. 1999) (interpreting the substantial advancement
test as requiring nothing more than that regulations not be arbitrary
or capricious).
153. See Casella v. City of Morgan Hill, 280 Cal. Rptr. 876, 884-85
(1991).
154. Cf Charles K. Rowley, Review Article: Donald Wittman's
The Myth of Democratic Failure, 92 Pub. Choice 15, 17 (1997) ("In
thin-rational accounts, agents are assumed to be rational only in the
sense that they employ efficiently the means available to pursue their
ends.").
155. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838-42.
156. See id. at 838-39.
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and the regulatory burden imposed: a cause-effect test...
The second meaning of the substantially advance re-
quirement-the cause-effect test-focuses on whether
the burden of a regulation is properly placed on a par-
ticular owner.157
It is the requirement of a cause-effect nexus, not just an ends-means
fit, that offers real protection against the imposition of unjustified or
disproportionate burdens on individual property owners. This fact
was emphasized by Justice Scalia in his separate opinion in Pennell
v. City of San Jose,158 in which he explained that, "a property regula-
tion does not 'substantially advance' the state's interest unless the
use of the property caused the problem the state was seeking to cor-
rect, or the property owner reaped unique benefits from the prob-
lem." 15
9
The importance of properly interpreting the substantial advance-
ment test as including an inquiry into causal relationships to ensure
meaningful judicial scrutiny has been recognized by Dean Kmiec'
6 °
and other scholars.' 61 But the importance of applying heightened
157. Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: Institutional Analysis
and the Problem of Takings, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 591, 602-04 (1998).
158. 485 U.S. 1, 20 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part.) ("Traditional land-use regulation (short of that
which totally destroys the economic value of property) does not vio-
late this [substantial advancement] principle because there is a
cause-and-effect relationship between the property use restricted by
the regulation and the social evil that the regulation seeks to rem-
edy.") (emphasis added).
159. McUsic, supra note 157.
160. See Kmiec, supra note 77 at 745 ("the 'substantially advance'
inquiry promulgated by the Court in Agins v. City of Tiburon, and
followed without exception thereafter, is-as the Court explained in
Nollan-an inquiry into the causal connection or nexus between
regulatory means and ends.") (emphasis added); Kmiec, supra note
138, at 1653 ("[T]he Nollan nexus requirement clearly is linked, not
just to a facile matching of the state's means or ends, but to whether
compensation is required because the end sought to be accomplished
places a disproportionate burden on a landowner.").
161. See, e.g., Edward H. Ziegler, Partial Taking Claims, Owner-
ship Rights in Land and Urban Planning Practice: The Emerging
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scrutiny in conjunction with the substantial advancement test has
never been more dramatically illustrated than by a pair of cases
springing from a common factual setting, Mayhew v. Town of
Sunnyvale16 2 and Dews v. Town of Sunnyvale.163 In Mayhew, a pro-
posed residential development was prohibited after years of negotia-
tions, on the grounds that it would be inconsistent with the town's
minimum lot size requirements. 164 The property owners sued, alleg-
ing that the town's actions failed to substantially advance legitimate
state interests. 165 A trial court agreed, finding that the town's denial
of the Mayhews' project "does not bear any factual relationship to
valid planning principles or objectives."' 166 The state supreme court
reversed, applying a deferential level of scrutiny' 67 to conclude that
the permit denial advanced Sunnyvale's legitimate interest in main-
taining "the overall character of the community and the unique char-
acter and lifestyle of the Town."'168
Dichotomy Between Uncompensated Regulation and Compensable
Benefit Extraction Under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, 22 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1 (2002) (citing importance of causa-
tion and proportionality in modem takings jurisprudence); Steven R.,
McCutcheon, Jr., Lessened Protection for Property Rights-The
Conjunctive Application of the Agins v. City of Tiburon Disjunctive
Test, 27 PACIFIC L. J. 1657, 1667 (1996) ("To satisfy the first prong
of Agins and the Just Compensation Clause, the advancement of le-
gitimate state interests may not be speculative or imaginative as
permitted under substantive due process, but must be 'substantial'
and bear a nexus to the harm caused by the landowner's develop-
ment of the property.") (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
162. 964 S.W. 2d 922 (Tex. 1998).
163. 109 F.Supp.2d 526 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
164. 964 S.W. 2d at 926.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 927.
167. The Texas Supreme Court offered a perfunctory acknowledg-
ment of Nollan's heightened scrutiny requirement, id. at 934, but
then ignored that standard in accepting at face value all of the
Town's proffered justifications for the permit denial. See id. at 935.
168. Id. at 935.
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Following a second permit denial, the Mayhews' successors in in-
terest sued in federal district court on equal protection grounds.' 69 In
contrast to the Texas Supreme Court, the federal judge applied a
heightened standard of review and found the town's building restric-
tions were racially motivated, designed _primarily to prevent minori-
ties from moving into the community.'70 In other words, by probing
beneath the town's pretextual rationale, the federal court was able to
determine that what local officials meant by preserving the "unique
character and lifestyle" of the town, was keeping it White.17' The
official rationalizations, unquestioningly accepted under the state
court's deferential review, were found to have comprised merely "a
facade in an unsuccessful attempt to shield [the Town] from liability
for excluding both African-Americans and affordable housing from
Sunnyvale.' 1
72
This sobering example should not be taken to mean that govern-
mental bad faith is the sole rationale for a meaningful standard of
review in takings cases. The nature and effect of restrictive land use
regulations must be subjected to more than bare rationality review if
courts are to determine whether any such measure effectively takes
private property for public use, no matter how well-intentioned it
may be. Nevertheless, history teaches that good faith on the part of
the regulatory bureaucracy can never be presumed.173 In the earliest
169. See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 109 F.Supp.2d 526, 529
(N.D. Tex. 2000).
170. See id. at 568-71.
171. See id. at 533 (The town's actual interest in denying the de-
velopment applications was inelegantly described by one insider as
"[keeping] 'niggers' out of Sunnyvale.").
172. Id. at 572. For further commentary on Mayhew / Dews, focus-
ing on the Texas court's misapplication of the "reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations" standard, see R. S. Radford & J. David
Breemer, Great Expectations: Will Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Clar-
ify the Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations in Regu-
latory Takings Law?, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 449, 523-26 (2001).
173. See, e.g., Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Thoughts on
The White River Junction Manifesto: A Reply to the "Gang of
Five's" Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of Prop-
erty, 19 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 685, 701 (1986) ("[I]t is past dispute
that there are regulatory entities at all levels and in all states which
simply refuse to recognize the constitutional rights of property own-
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regulatory takings cases in California, local governments abandoned
efforts to condemn private land because they realized they could
exercise equally complete control over the property by regulation,
without incurring the costs of acquisition.174 As Justice Scalia
pointed out at oral argument in City of Monterey, deference to local
governments in such cases would amount to stripping their citizen-
victims of their Fifth Amendment rights:
JUSTICE SCALIA: Now, let's talk about deference to
the city's judgment. I can under--our normal rule is that
we do defer and, if there's a rational basis, that's all we
look to. But where you have a consistent process, as is al-
leged here, of turning down one plan, the next plan, the
next plan, okay, I'll do this to satisfy you, isn't there
some point at which, although there's a rational basis for
the fifth decision, a rational basis for the fourth and the
third and the second and the first, you begin to smell a
rat, and at that point can't we say, despite our normal ra-
tional basis review, there's some other factor that begins
to come in here, and that is, at some point you can say,
this is simply unreasonable.
175
ers."); Norman Williams, Jr., R. Marlin Smith, Charles Siemon,
Daniel R. Mandelker & Richard F. Babcock, The White River Junc-
tion Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REv. 193, 242-43 (1984) (describing bad-
faith tactics by land-use regulators as "ubiquitous, vicious, and de-
void of any semblance of procedural due process").
174. See Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613 (1976);
Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F.Supp. 962 (N.D.
Cal. 1975); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P. 2d 25 (1979).
175. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, No. 97-1235, transcript
of oral argument, 1998 WL 721087, 67 USLW 3298, 67 USLW
3482, (U.S.Oral.Arg. Oct. 07, 1998), at *17. In the view of at least
one observer, City of Monterey "involved a tale of governmental
chicanery so palpable that the questions at oral argument led some to
believe that the Court would establish takings liability based on bad
faith." Berger, supra note 68, at 440. See also Steven J. Eagle, Del
Monte Dunes, Good Faith, and Land Use Regulation, 30 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10100 (2000) ("Many of the questions at oral argument and
much of the Justices' opinions [in City of Monterey] evince the
Court's growing concern that governmental officials deal with prop-
erty owners with good faith.").
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In recognition of the reality of this aspect of land-use regulation, the
Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra for the first time specifically identi-
fied governmental bad faith as a determinant of whether a challenged
regulation substantially advances legitimate state interests.176 And
although the Court narrowly declined to review another bad-faith
claim under this standard, the three Justices who would have granted
certiorari in Lambert v. City and County of San Francisco177 made it
clear that this is an important issue in the Court's deliberations.' 
78
IV. THE REAL OBJECTION TO THE SUBSTANTIAL ADVANCEMENT
STANDARD
The tenacity and persistence of the opposition to the substantial
advancement test, especially in view of the cool reception their
views have received at the Supreme Court, suggests that critics of
this standard are really voicing one or the other of two underlying
concerns. First, there is the formalistic conviction that the Constitu-
tion is comprised of a conglomeration of distinct provisions, each of
which should have its own distinct standards, and the Court's insis-
tence on cross-fertilizing-applying standards that were developed
in the equal protection arena to free speech cases, or due process to
takings-is just, well, messy. To this objection, the most realistic
response is, "welcome to the world of constitutional law."
The other view is at its root a protest against the Supreme Court's
fundamental approach to regulatory takings analysis-and indeed,
against the very concept of regulatory takings. For some Takings
Clause doves, efforts to repudiate the substantial advancement test
comprise merely one facet of a broader agenda to reject the Supreme
Court's regulatory takings doctrine in toto. The argument to relegate
Agins' first prong to a due process inquiry may seem more plausible,
because it appears to be more limited, than calls for overruling Penn
176. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 202, 333 (2001).
177. 529 U.S. 1045 (2000).
178. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting
that "the record belies" San Francisco's claim that it did not with-
hold a development permit because applicant would not agree to pay
the city $600,000).
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Central179 and Pennsylvania Coal,180 or for the outright elimination
of regulatory takings as a viable constitutional claim.' 81 Neverthe-
less, since the substantial advancement test or its conceptual equiva-
lent has been an element of the Supreme Court's takings jurispru-
dence since its inception, arguments to eliminate this standard fit
easily within the broader assault on regulatory takings per se.182 The
179. See, e.g., Echeverria, supra note 65.
180. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 39, at 97-107.
181. See, e.g., id.; Williams, Jr., et. al., supra note 173; Fred
Bosselman, David Callies & John Banta, THE TAKING ISSUE: A
STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF GOVERNMENTAL
AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE USE OF PRIVATELY-OWNED LAND
WITHOUT PAYING COMPENSATION TO THE OWNERS 238 (1973) (urg-
ing the Supreme Court to overrule Pennsylvania Coal and hold that
"a regulation of the use of land, if reasonably related to a valid pub-
lic purpose, can never constitute a taking"); Charles M. Haar & Mi-
chael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: the Survival of Progressive Juris-
prudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158, 2168 (2002) (urging the Court
to avoid "opprobrium" and "ignominy" by abandoning its regulatory
takings jurisprudence and reverting exclusively to deferential, due
process review).
182. Commenting on the Solicitor General's brief attacking the
substantial advancement standard in City of Monterey, Dean Kmiec
recognized that "[t]he object, of course, was to eliminate any mean-
ingful judicial review of land-use decisions." Douglas W. Kmiec,
The "Substantially Advance" Quandary: How Closely Should
Courts Examine the Regulatory Means and Ends of Legislative Ap-
plications?, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES 371, 372 (Thomas E. Roberts, ed., 2002).
The outright elimination of the Supreme Court's regulatory takings
doctrine has occasionally been identified explicitly as the ultimate
goal of the Takings Clause doves. See, e.g., Bosselman, Callies &
Banta, supra note 181, at 238-55 (endorsing Justice Brandeis' dis-
sent in Pennsylvania Coal and urging the Supreme Court to repudi-
ate its regulatory takings doctrine); Williams, Jr., et. al., supra note
173, at 194 ("We now state without equivocation that as a general
proposition neither the Constitution, constitutional jurisprudence nor
any decision of the United States Supreme Court commands or justi-
fies the payment of compensation as a remedy when a land use regu-
lation is found to be a constitutionally impermissible taking.");
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underlying theme is that courts should not apply the Takings Clause
in any situation not involving outright physical appropriations:
What is wrong with a simple reading of the Takings
Clause that would apply it to occasions when the gov-
ernment actually physically takes and uses the land in
question? What limitations could there then be on the
government's overreaching by regulation? What should
a court do when the government goes too far? If 'goes
too far' means the same thing as interfering with due
process rights in property, then the more consistent, pre-
dictable, and traditional result would be to strike down
the regulation as an unconstitutional denial of due proc-
ess.
Of course, what's "wrong" with eliminating the doctrine of regula-
tory takings was spelled out by Justice Brennan in his dissent in San
Diego Gas & Electric v. City of San Diego,184 the first opinion to
employ the term, "regulatory taking." There, the City of San Diego
had down-zoned 233 acres of the plaintiffs land to open space, an
action the trial court "unequivocally" found to amount to a taking
under the Fifth Amendment. 185 This finding was upheld on appeal,
but the California Supreme Court reversed, adopting the rule pro-
posed by the passage above: a land use regulation can never violate
the Takings Clause, but at worst may be invalidated as a violation of
due process. 186 As Justice Brennan pointed out, invalidation is
hardly an adequate remedy for a plaintiff who (in that case) was de-
prived of the use of its property for seven years. 87 At least equally
important, the unavailability of a regulatory taking claim encourages
Byrne, supra note 39 (arguing that Pennsylvania Coal should be
overruled and the entire regulatory takings doctrine be abolished);
John D. Echeverria, The Once and Future Penn Central Test, 54
LAND USE L. & ZONING DIGEST 6:19 (2002) (urging the Supreme
Court to overrule Penn Central and entertain only categorical takings
claims); Echeverria, supra note 113 (same).
183. Kenneth Salzberg, Rights with Responsibilities Land Use Law
Symposium: "Takings" as Due Process, or Due Process as "Tak-
ings"?, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 418 (2002).
184. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
185. Id. at 644 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
186. See id. at 621.
187. See id. at 644 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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government agencies to promptly adopt new regulations whenever
one is struck down on due process grounds, to maintain oppressive
and unconstitutional restrictions indefinitely. Justice Brennan
brought this point home by quoting extensively, in his San Diego
Gas dissent, from a tract circulated by a California city attorney,
light-heartedly urging his colleagues to do just that.1 88
A few of the staunchest Takings Clause doves have directly repu-
diated Justice Brennan's reasoning, insisting that compensation un-
der the Takings Clause should never be required for land use regula-
tions, no matter how draconian or basely motivated.189 More com-
monly, however, the imposition of regulatory takings liability is re-
jected on more abstract grounds: close judicial review of legislative
or administrative actions is said to undermine the separation of pow-
ers,19° threaten the principle of democratic self-government,' 91 be
188. See id at 655-57:
At the 1974 annual conference of the National Institute of
Municipal Law Officers in California, a California City
Attorney gave fellow City Attorneys the following ad-
vice:
"IF ALL ELSE FAILS, MERELY AMEND THE
REGULATION AND START OVER AGAIN.
"If legal preventive maintenance does not work, and you
still receive a claim attacking the land use regulation, or
if you try the case and lose, don't worry about it. All is
not lost. One of the extra 'goodies' contained in the re-
cent [California] Supreme Court case of Selby v. City of
San Buenaventura, 10 C.3d 110, [109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 514
P.2d 111] appears to allow the City to change the regula-
tion in question, even after trial and judgment, make it
more reasonable, more restrictive, or whatever, and eve-
rybody starts over again.
189. See Williams, Jr., et. al., supra note 173, at 193-97.
190. See, e.g., id. at 233-34; Echeverria, supra note 113, at 240.
191. See, e.g., Brief of Appellants, Chevron USA, Inc., v.
Cayetano, supra note 84, at 40 (arguing that validity of an allegedly
unconstitutional regulation "should be decided by the people through
their elected representatives, and not by judges").
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contrary to the plain language of the Drafters, 192 or signal a return to
"Lochnerism."' 3 At this level of generality, however, these argu-
192. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Regulatory Takings and Judicial Su-
premacy, 51 ALA. L. REV. 949, 955 (2000); Kendall, Dowling &
Schwartz, supra note 24, at 4-6; J. Byrne, supra note 39, at 91-96;
Echeverria, supra note 8, at 859-61. But see Andrew S. Gold, The
Diminishing Equivalence Between Regulatory Takings and Physical
Takings, 107 DICK. L. REV. 571, 588 (2003) ("the plain language of
the Takings Clause ... refers to neither eminent domain, physical
appropriation, nor regulatory takings"). A variation on the "plain
language" argument is the claim that the original intent of the Draft-
ers did not encompass regulatory takings. See, e.g., William Michael
Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compen-
sation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L. J. 694 (1985).
Taking this claim seriously as grounds for repudiating modem tak-
ings jurisprudence would, as Prof. Kanner has pointed out, justify "a
wholesale overruling of everything from desegregation cases, the
Miranda rule, and the reapportionment cases, to Roe v. Wade."
Gideon Kanner, Theories Du Jour: Regulators' Responses to the
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY: INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND RELATED
GOVERNMENT LIABILITY 97, 112 (Sept. 1999). Ultimately, however,
like the "plain language" argument, the original-intent claim fails on
its own terms:
There is, in fact, little direct evidence about the Framers'
reasons for adopting the Takings Clause.. .The truth is
that no one who participated in the drafting and ratifica-
tion of the Takings Clause-including James Madison,
who bears the most responsibility for the Clause-had
given any sustained thought to the purposes of eminent
domain and the compensation requirement. The under-
standing of these purposes remained to be worked out
over time.
David A. Dana & Thomas W. Merrill, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 9, 25
(2002).
193. See, e.g., Williams, Jr., supra note 139, at 462-73. The prose
on this topic has seldom surpassed the deep purple of Professor Wil-
liams, who sees decisions under the substantial advancement stan-
dard as "deny[ing] the priority of the public interest forwarded by
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ments run aground on the commonplace observation that the Consti-
tution was intended to check majoritarian excesses,1 94 and interpret-
ing the document's proper application to the other two branches of
government has been an essential attribute of the judiciary since
Marbury v. Madison. 19 5 As for the bogeyman of Lochner, no supra-
textual normative charter is required for courts to administer the
straightforward protections of property owners that animate the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The proper role of a court applying
the substantial advancement test to takings claims has seldom been
expressed more clearly than by Chief Judge Loren Smith of the
Court of Federal Claims:
In takings claims the judge does not sit as super legislator
or executive, intent on preventing regulation that "goes
too far," as a facile reading of Justice Holmes might im-
ply. The job of the court is to deal with a concrete claim,
by an aggrieved person or persons, that their Constitu-
tional rights under the Fifth Amendment have been vio-
lated by some governmental action. The court must pro-
ceed to analyze this claim, as any other legal claim, re-
gardless of the consequences to government policy. 196
the vessel of the regulatory state over the interests of private capital."
Id. at 429.
194. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (2d
ed. 1986) (discussing the "countermajoritarian" aspects of judicial
review of the constitutionality of statutes); John Hart Ely,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135-79
(1980) (outlining importance of effective judicial review in protect-
ing rights of minorities against majoritarian excesses).
195. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See also Bickel, supra note
194, at 1-14 (critiquing the argument for judicial review flowing
from Marbury).
196. Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 150-51 (1996). Appli-
cation of the substantial advancement test has been described as a
straightforward two stage inquiry, (1) Is the governmental objective
within the ambit of the police power?; and (2) If so, does the pro-
posed solution violate the constitutional rights of some citizens?
Berger & Kanner, supra note 173, at 730. See also Douglas W.
Kmiec, 2 ZONING & PLAN. DESKBOOK § 7:18 (2d ed. updated Feb.
2004) ("In Nollan... the Court made it abundantly clear that it had
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In the final analysis, arguments against the substantial advance-
ment test, heightened scrutiny of takings claims, and the regulatory
takings doctrine itself all share a common origin: an anachronistic
yearning for expansive governmental authority over individuals and
their property, untrammeled by meaningful constitutional restraints.
In the United States, this worldview passed from the scene with the
New Deal, and no amount of quibbling over the wording of Supreme
Court decisions is likely to resurrect it. As one veteran of the takings
wars has put it, "[i]f real people were not at stake, this might be an
intriguing intellectual matter."' 97 It is in recognition of the fact that
real people are burdened by oppressive and sometimes malevolent
regulations that the Supreme Court crafted its regulatory takings ju-
risprudence and-messy though it is-real people still require its
protection from the excesses of the modern regulatory state.
no desire to resurrect the so-called Lochner era and the discredited
practice of judicial disagreement with legislatively chosen policy
objectives. By contrast, the 'substantially advance' inquiry... [is] a
heightened inquiry into the causal connection or nexus between
regulatory means and ends."); John A. Humbach, "Taking" the Im-
perial Judiciary Seriously: Segmenting Property Interests and Judi-
cial Revision of Legislative Judgments, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 771,
785 (1993) ("The two-pronged Agins test of regulatory taking sets
boundaries on legislative power based on criteria unconcerned with
the reviewing court's view of the merit, wisdom or correctness of
balance embodied in the particular legislation in question."). The
Supreme Court made the same point in City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at
705-07.
197. Berger, supra note 102, at 4-15.
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